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The rapid proliferation of mobile applications and services has introduced new vulnerabilities that do not exist in fixed wired
networks. Traditional security mechanisms, such as access control and encryption, turn out to be ineﬃcient in modern wireless
networks. Given the shortcomings of the protection mechanisms, an important research focuses in intrusion detection systems
(IDSs). This paper proposes a multilayer statistical intrusion detection framework for wireless networks. The architecture is
adequate to wireless networks because the underlying detection models rely on radio parameters and traﬃc models. Accurate
correlation between radio and traﬃc anomalies allows enhancing the eﬃciency of the IDS. A radio signal fingerprinting
technique based on the maximal overlap discrete wavelet transform (MODWT) is developed. Moreover, a geometric clustering
algorithm is presented. Depending on the characteristics of the fingerprinting technique, the clustering algorithm permits to
control the false positive and false negative rates. Finally, simulation experiments have been carried out to validate the proposed
IDS.
Copyright © 2009 Mohamed Hamdi et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution
License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly
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1. Introduction
Mobile applications and services relying on wireless commu-
nication infrastructures have dramatically expanded during
last years. Ad hoc networks, wireless local area networks
(WLANs), and WIMAX are just examples of a panoply of
technologies that are continuing to proliferate. In addition,
more sophisticated communication techniques are expected
to appear in the near future. The intrinsic features of wireless
mobile networks make them more vulnerable than wired
fixed networks. For instance, the nature of wireless radio
links renders the network vulnerable not only to passive
eavesdropping but also to active interfering. Moreover,
in many contexts, the network consists of autonomous
mobile nodes that are capable of acting independently.
Hence, without an appropriate physical protection, nodes
can be compromised and used to carry out malicious
activities.
The shortcomings of the security mechanisms used in
wireless networks exacerbate the need for new detection
techniques which should defend against sophisticated mobile
attacks. In the literature, many attempts have been done
to fulfill this need. Most of the existing approaches rely on
intrinsic signal characteristics to detect intrusion events.
In this paper, a novel multilayer intrusion detection
process for wireless networks is introduced. We consider a set
of detectors using heterogeneous features corresponding to
diﬀerent network layers and collected by specific preproces-
sors. Four major layers are used in our context: the physical
layer, the link layer, the transport layer, and the application
layer. A set of parameters from each layer is collected,
preprocessed, and submitted to the corresponding detector
in order to state about the occurrence of malicious events.
A postprocessing module has also been designed in order
to refine the available information about the attacker by
accurately determining its position. The main contributions
of our work can be briefly described through the following
points.
(1) The physical layer preprocessor, aiming at gathering
intrinsic features of the wireless network interfaces, relies on
the maximal overlap discrete wavelet transform (MODWT)
and geometric unsupervised classification. It is shown to
ensure better performances than that in [1] essentially
because of its shift-preserving property. To our knowledge,
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the MODWT has not been previously used in the intrusion
detection context.
(2) The transport and application layer detection mech-
anisms measure the deviation of the real-time traﬃc from
a preestablished model which is adaptively updated. This
allows detecting traﬃc pattern distortion attacks. In fact, we
introduce two novel traﬃc models corresponding to the TCP
protocol (transport layer) and video transmission (appli-
cation layer). We represent the traﬃc by a long memory
process. If the attacker attempts to embed forged packets
within a normal stream, our approach allows detecting his
activity.
(3) Our intrusion detection process is multilayer, mean-
ing that it can analyze a single-packet stream at diﬀerent
layers, beginning by the physical layer. Furthermore, all of
the preprocessing, detection, and postprocessing techniques
are statistical. The fact that the proposed architecture is
purely statistical corroborates the idea stated in [2] and
stating that “statistical anomaly detection will be among
the most eﬃcient intrusion detection techniques for wireless
networks.”
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2
reviews the most important intrusion detection techniques
for wireless networks. Section 3 briefly presents wavelet
theory fundamentals and highlights the diﬀerence between
the traditional DWT and the MODWT. The architecture
of the proposed IDS is described in Section 4. Section 5
designs the physical layer preprocessing components and
shows how network interfaces can be robustly authenticated
in a wireless environment. An antispoofing filter based on
geometric unsupervised classification of the data provided
by the physical and link layer preprocessors is detailed in
Section 6. The transport and application layer preprocessors
are addressed in Section 7. A technique based on the
estimation of the Hurst exponent is used for this pur-
pose. Section 8 describes the simulation environment and
discusses the results provided by the proposed techniques.
Finally, Section 9 concludes the paper.
2. Intrusion Detection in Wireless Networks
This section examines the state of intrusion detection in
wireless networks, with a particular emphasis on statistical
approaches. The wireless intrusion detection system is a
network component aiming at protecting the network by
detecting wireless attacks, which target wireless networks
having specific features and characteristics. Wireless intru-
sions can belong to two categories of attacks. The first
category targets the fixed part of the wireless network, such
as MAC spoofing, IP spoofing, and DoS; and the second
category of these attacks targets the radio part of the wireless
network, such as the access point (AP) rogue, noise flooding,
and wireless network sniﬃng. The latter attacks are more
complex because they are hard to detect and to trace back
[3, 4].
To detect such complex attacks, the WIDS deploys
approaches and techniques provided by intrusion detection
systems (IDSs) protecting wired networks [5]. Among these
approaches, one can find the signature-based and anomaly-
based approaches. The first approach consists in matching
user’s patterns with attack’s signatures. The second approach
aims at detecting any deviation of the “normal” behavior of
the network entities. The deployment of the aforementioned
approaches in wireless environment requires some modifi-
cations. Features and characteristics of wireless environment
make the use of traditional approaches of detection very
diﬃcult. The major feature is mobility, where information
have to be gathered from diﬀerent mobile sources, which may
require a real-time traﬃc analysis. Moreover, there are no
clear diﬀerences between “normal” and “abnormal” behavior
in mobile environment. Because of the mobility feature, a
node can send false information, which can be established
as an “abnormal” behavior.
Therefore, traditional approaches of detection have to be
revised. The signature-based approach in wireless networks
may require the use of a knowledge base containing the
wireless attack signatures while an anomaly-based approach
requires the definition of profiles specific to wireless entities
(mobile users and AP). The wireless intrusion detection
can be done by monitoring the active components of
the wireless network, such as the APs [6]. Generally, the
WIDS is designed to monitor and report on network
activities between communicating devices. To do this, the
WIDS has to capture and decode wireless network traﬃc
[7, 8]. While some WIDSs can only capture and store
wireless traﬃc. For example, WITS [9] retain multiple log
files that contain system statistics and suﬃcient network-
related data in order to trace back the intruder. Other
WIDSs are able to analyze signal fingerprints, which can
be useful in detecting and tracking rogue AP attack [10].
Moreover, due to their distributed nature, wireless networks,
especially ad hoc networks, are vulnerable to attacks. In
this case, wireless intrusion detection provides audit and
monitoring capabilities by deploying clustering algorithms to
collaboratively detect wireless intrusions [5, 11].
3. Wavelet Theory Fundamentals
Let X = [X0, . . . ,XN−1] be a vector of observations from a
stochastic process, the discrete wavelet transform (DWT) is
an orthonormal transform that maps X into a vector W =
[W0, . . . ,WN−1] at a resolution J , where {W0, . . . ,WN−1}
denotes a set of reals, called the DWT coeﬃcients, andN= 2J .
More accurately, the DWT can be expressed as follows:
W =WXT , (1)
where T denotes the transposition operator, W is an N × N
matrix defining the DWT and satisfying WWT = IN , and IN
is the identity matrix of dimension N .
Obviously, orthonormality implies that X = WTW
and ‖X‖2 = ‖W‖2. Moreover, the elements of W can be
decomposed into J + 1 subvectors such that
(i) the first J subvectors are denoted by (W j) j=1,...,J , and
the jth subvector contains all of the DWT coeﬃcients
for scale τj= 2 j . This means that W j is a column
vector with N/τj elements;
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(ii) the final subvector is denoted as V j and contains only
the scaling coeﬃcient WN−1.
Consequently, we obtain the multiresolution representation




















+ VTJ VJ ,
(3)
where W j and VJ are matrices defined by partitioning the
rows of W according to the partition of W into W1, . . . , WJ ,
and VJ . Thus, W j is a (N/τj) × N matrix and VJ is a row
vector of N elements.
Several variants of the DWT have been developed for
various contexts. In this paper, we use the maximal overlap
discrete wavelet transform that has been first proposed in
[12]. In contrast to the traditional DWT, the application
of the MODWT to a vector X at a given level J yields
the column vectors W˜1, W˜2, . . . , W˜J , each of dimension N .
The vector W˜ j , for a specific j in {1, . . . , J}, contains the
MODWT wavelet coeﬃcients associated with changes in
X on a scale τj = 2 j−1. The vector VJ contains the DWT
coeﬃcients the MODWT scaling coeﬃcients associated with
variations at scale τJ = 2J . More concretely, for a given level
j, the components of the N dimensional vectors W˜ j and V˜ j










for t = 0, . . . ,N − 1, where h is the wavelet filter, g is the
scaling filter, L denotes the width of h and g, h˜ j,l = hj,l/2 j/2,
g˜ j,l = gj,l/2 j/2, and Lj = (2 j − 1)(L− 1) + 1.
The most important properties of the MODWT are given
in the following.
(i) While the partial DWT of level J restricts the
vector size (representing the observations) to 2J , the
MODWT of level J is well defined for any sample size
N . When N is a multiple of 2J , the DWT can be com-
puted by a number of multiplications that is of O(N)
complexity using the pyramidal algorithm, whereas
the corresponding MODWT requires a number of
multiplications which is of O(N log2 N) complexity.
(ii) As for the DWT, the MODWT can be used to
build a multiresolution analysis. On the opposite
to the traditional DWT, the details and smooths of
this multiresolution analysis are such that circularly
shifting the input vector by any amount will shift each
detail and smooth by a corresponding amount.
(iii) In contrast with the DWT, the MODWT details and
smooths are associated with zero-phase filters, thus
making it easy to line up features in a multiresolution
with original observation vector meaningfully.
(iv) The MODWT can be used to carry out an analysis of
variance based on the wavelet and scaling coeﬃcients.
(v) Whereas a circular shift on the observation vector
results in modifying the DWT-based power spectra,
the corresponding MODWT-based spectra remain
unchanged. In fact, we can obtain the MODWT of a
circularly shifted time series by just applying a similar
shift to each of the components (W˜ j) j∈{1,...,J} and V˜J
of the MODWT of the original observation vector
The last property is crucial in the context of variance changes.
In fact, the signal is often shifted due to the lack of time
synchronization between the nodes of the wireless network.
The MODWT, therefore, seems to be more convenient than
the traditional DWT in this case because it preserves the time
shift.
4. A Multilayer Detection Process for
Wireless Networks
In this section, we discuss the architecture of the proposed
multilayer statistical intrusion detection approach. We con-
sider three major modules: (a) the preprocessor; (b) the
detector; and (c) the postprocessor. Each module can be
decomposed at a finer granularity into a set of submodules.
Figure 1 shows the basic architecture.
In the following, we discuss the functions implemented
by the three modules mentioned above.
(1) The physical and link layer preprocessors: the main
objective at this level is to extract several features from the
radio signals in order to determine whether the originating
transceiver eﬀectively has the MAC address included in
the link-layer header of the corresponding data frames.
This allows detecting and identifying the attackers using
device impersonation or MAC address spoofing techniques
in order to hide their identities or gain unauthorized
privileges. To implement this module, we develop a Radio
Frequency Fingerprinting (RFF) technique (see Section 5).
RFF has been successfully applied in many fields including
wireless device localization, forensics, and radio frequency
identification (RFID). Roughly speaking, an RFF technique
should perform two fundamental tasks: transient detection
and feature extraction. One novelty of our preprocessor is
















Figure 1: Architecture of the proposed multilayered intrusion detection process.
that it relies on the MODWT to detect the beginning of
the transient. We carried out simulations to highlight the
enhancement introduced by this wavelet-based technique.
The most important advantage of using MODWT is its shift-
invariance property. In fact, given that clock synchronization
can hardly be achieved in wireless networks, especially those
using ad hoc infrastructures, the signal emanating from
an emitting node will necessarily be time shifted when
reaching its destination. This can severely aﬀect the transient
detection functionality, which is an important phase of the
fingerprinting process. The results of these simulations are
discussed in Section 8.
(2) Geometric unsupervised classification: typically, an
unsupervised classification approach takes as input a set
of unlabeled data and attempts to find specific events
buried within the data. In the antispoofing problem, we are
given a set of data, where it is unknown which originate
from authenticated transceivers and which originate from
impersonated devices. The goal is to identify the anomalous
elements. The main advantage of such approaches is that
they do not require the injection of a purely normal training
set. The algorithm can indeed perform over unlabeled data.
This is convenient with the anomaly detection context
because the antispoofing filter operating in a mobile wireless
environment should cope with a varying set of MAC
addresses (as nodes may join or leave the network). The key
characteristic of our framework (proposed in Section 6) is
a mapping the data provided by the physical and link layer
preprocessors to a feature space, which is basically a vector
space. Inside this vector space, the elements that are in low-
density regions of the probability distribution are labeled as
anomalous.
(3) Traﬃc model-based detection: techniques for detect-
ing previously unseen network intrusion attempts often
depend on finding anomalous behavior in network traﬃc
streams. It follows that there is a need to produce traﬃc
models that accurately reflect the characteristics of the
applications of interest. It has been noticed in [13, 14]
that a large number of superimposed heavy-tailed ON/OFF
processes can yield self-similar traﬃc with degree of self-
similarity assessed by the Hurst parameter [15]. In Section 7,
we propose two models for the TCP protocol and for
video transmission. These models allow detecting abnormal
behavior (e.g., traﬃc pattern distortion).
In the following sections, we develop the detection mech-
anisms associated to the three aforementioned modules.
Section 5 shows how physical layer preprocessing is carried
out. The clustering algorithm allowing to discard spoofed
packets is introduced in Section 6. Section 7 proposes a
technique allowing to detect traﬃc injection attacks based on
self-similarity of TCP and video traﬃc behavior.
5. Physical Layer Preprocessor Design
One problem associated with the application of the DWT for
transient detection is that it suﬀers from a lack of translation
invariance. This means that a time series will not necessarily
shift its DWT coeﬃcients in a similar manner.
Let X = [X0, . . . ,XN−1] be a time series representing the
amplitude of the signal generated by a wireless transceiver.
X can be regarded as a sequence of R random vari-
ables X0, . . . , XR−1 with zero means and diﬀerent variances
σ20 , . . . , σ
2
R−1. Supposing that the beginning of the transient
corresponds to a variance change point, the transient detec-
tion problem can be modeled as a test statistic H involving
two hypotheses, H0 and H1, expressed by
H0: σ20 = · · · = σ2R−1,
H1: σ20 = · · · σ2k /= σ2k+1 = σ2R−1.
(5)
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This test corresponds to cumulative sums of squares test

























It is noteworthy that Ck measures the accumulation of
variance in the signal as a function of time.
According to the definitions given above, the variance
change point can be defined as
k0 = argmax(H), (7)
where the operator argmax returns the integer k0 for which
the k-dependent expression is maximal.
6. Geometric Unsupervised Classification
6.1. Feature Space Design. The objective of this phase is to
extract the features from the transient portion of the signal
using information from the time or frequency domain. In
order to cope with the nonstationarity of the transient, a
sliding window is considered. Supposing that the number of
samples in the transient signal is Ns and that w is the width








where s is the sliding factor for the windowing process.
Every time the window is slided by s, we compute the
average amplitude and frequency. For a frame φi, and a
window j, ai j and fi j denote the average amplitude and
frequency of the corresponding transient, respectively. The
feature map allowing to represent the features of the captured
frame will be defined as follows:
μw,s: Φ −→ R2Nt ×M
φi −→
(




where M is the set of MAC addresses and mi is the physical
address included in the link-layer header of frame φi.
Moreover, we introduce an application δ on (R2Nt×M)×
(R2Nt ×M) such that, for every x1 = [x11, . . . , x12Nt+1] and x2 =
[x12, . . . , x
2










(i) x˜i = [xi1, . . . , xi2Nt ]T for i ∈ {1, 2} is the prefix of xi
having 2Nt components;
(ii) ⊕ denotes the “exclusive OR” operator on binary
strings;
(iii) · denotes the complement operator on binary
strings;
(iv) (·)10 denotes the conversion of a binary string to the
decimal basis;
(v) ‖·‖ denotes the l2-norm on R2Nt .
It can be easily proved that δ defines a distance on (R2Nt ×
M)× (R2Nt ×M). In the following, this distance will be used
to build the frame clusters. To this end, we extend δ to the set













In the following subsection, we use the distance δφ to
develop a clustering algorithm on the set of frames.
6.2. Distance-Based Clustering. The goal of this algorithm is
to compute the local density of the feature space. In other
terms, it should compute how many points are “near” each
point in the feature space. In our context, these points, also
referred to as elements, correspond to the captured network
frames. The principal parameter of the algorithm is a radius
r also referred to as cluster width. For any pair of points x1
and x2 in the feature space, we consider the two points “near”
each other if their distance is less than or equal to r, which
represents the typical cluster radius (i.e., δ(x1, x2) ≤ r).
For each point x, we define N(x) to be the number of
points that is within r of point x. More formally, N(x) is
expressed using the set cardinality function |·| as follows:
N(x) = ∣∣{s | δ(x, s) ≤ r}∣∣. (12)
The straightforward computation of N(x) for all points has
a complexity of O(|Φ|2), where |Φ| is the cardinality of
|Φ|. The reason is that we have to compute the pairwise
distances between all points. The approach that we develop in
Algorithm 1 allows to defineNc clusters based on the distance
δφ. The complexity of this algorithm is O(Nc·|Φ|). This is
mainly because the construction of one cluster requires one
pass through the set Φ.
The clustering process is as follows. The first point in Φ
(i.e., φ1) is the center of the first cluster. For every subsequent
point, if it is within r of a cluster center, it is added to
that cluster. Otherwise, it is a center of a new cluster. Two
important remarks about this clustering algorithm should be
highlighted.
(1) Several points may be added to multiple clusters at
the same time. We will show that this fact does not
aﬀect the anomaly detection process because it relies
essentially on the cardinality of every cluster and the
local density of the elements within the feature space.
(2) The first point in every cluster is the center of
the cluster meaning that an unclustered element
is assessed with respect to this point to determine
whether it should be appended to the cluster or not.




∀i ∈ {1, . . . , |Φ|}
x := 0;
∀ j ∈ {1, . . . ,Nc}
if δ(φi, c
j
1) < r then




if x = 0 then




return (C1, . . . ,CNc )
end
Algorithm 1: (C1, . . . ,CNc ) = clustering (Φ).
6.3. Spoofed Frame Detection. Having clustered the set of
captured frames, the IDS should identify the anomalous
samples. According to our approach, the anomalies cor-
responding to MAC address spoofing correspond to low-
density regions of the probability distribution in the feature
space. This is because the clustering algorithm presented in
the previous subsection intuitively clusters the set of frames
according to their source MAC addresses. The details of the
subsequent procedure are given in Algorithm 2. In addition
to the distance δφ defined in (11), the algorithm uses the
Mahalanobis distance that has been introduced in [16]. We
use this distance to measure the intercluster correlation.
More theoretically, we define the distance δM on Φ × Φ
as follows:













where R is the covariance matrix of φ1 and φ2. If the
covariance matrix is diagonal, the Mahalanobis distance can




















where σφ1 and σφ2 stand for the standard deviations of φ1 and
φ2, respectively.
Hence, we develop an anomaly detection algorithm that
characterizes an attack instance as a frame φ verifying one
among the following properties.
(1) φ belongs to a cluster Ck which is “far,” in terms
of Mahalanobis distance, from the most populated
cluster.
(2) φ is far from the centroid of the cluster to which it
belongs.
In the following, we discuss informally the anomaly
detection algorithm.
(1) Find the largest cluster, that is, the one with the
highest number of elements. This cluster is by default
labeled as normal. Its centroid is labeled as cπ(1)1 .
(2) Sort the remaining clusters in descending order of the
Mahalanobis distance from each cluster to Cπ(1).
(3) Within every cluster, sort the elements in descending
order according to their distance δφ from c
π(1)
1 .
(4) Select the first ε1Nc clusters and label them as
potentially normal.
(5) Within every cluster Ck, select the first ε2|Ck| ele-
ments and label them as normal.
(6) All the elements that have not been labeled as normal
are labeled as attacks.
Clearly, the eﬃciency of this anomaly detection approach
mainly depends on the choice of the parameters ε1 and
ε2. The false positive rate increases when the values of ε1
and ε2 are excessively small because most of the captured
frames would be labeled as abnormal. Conversely, if ε1 and
ε2 are large (i.e., very close to 1), the false negative rate
increases as most of the frames would be labeled as normal.
Moreover, the fingerprinting approach has an obvious
influence on the false negative rate. If the RFF approach
does not allow distinguishing two transients generated by
two distinct transceivers, the eﬃciency of the geometric
classification algorithm is severely aﬀected. A good choice of
the parameters ε1 and ε2 can be found experimentally.
7. Transport and Application Layer
Statistical Detection
Network traﬃc is known to present fractal characteristics
such as long-range dependence (also called self-similarity)
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(C1, . . . ,CNc ) = clustering (Φ)
Find j such that |Cj| = maxk∈{1,...,Nc}
Build the permutation π such that
(i) π(1) = j
(ii)∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,Nc}, δM(Cπ(k),Cπ(1)) ≤ δM(Cπ(k−1),Cπ(1))
For every k ∈ {1, . . . ,Nc}
Build the permutation πk such that












The set of anomalous events A is expressed by









Algorithm 2: A = anomaly detection (Φ).
[13, 17], which can be accurately measured using the wavelet
transform. This section investigates the use of the wavelet
transform and change-point detection algorithms in order
to detect the instants when fractality changes abruptly.
We demonstrate that transport-layer and application-layer
traﬃc data exhibit long-range dependence features. We
particularly study the examples of the transmission control
protocol (TCP) at the transport layer and real-time video
transmission at the application layer. We show how the Hurst
parameter, which expresses the intensity of the long-range
dependence phenomenon, can be estimated through the use
of the wavelet transforms. Recent studies have pointed out
that TCP flows as well as real-time traﬃc tend to have
self-similar behavior because of the intrinsic mechanisms
they implement such as traﬃc generation, aggregation, and
control. The interested reader would refer to [14, 17] for
more details about these results. A detection approach can
be developed by measuring the instant, where the traﬃc
deviates from its normal model. This detection approach can
be particularly eﬃcient to detect traﬃc distortion attacks,
which consist in changing the traﬃc normal behavior by
dropping packets or injecting packets [18].
7.1. Modeling the Transport and Application Layers Traﬃc as
a Long-Range Dependent Processes. A stationary stochastic
process X is said to be long range if its autocorrelation
function decays at a rate slower than a negative exponential.
In the frequency domain, long-range dependence appears as
a 1/ f spectrum around the origin, meaning that
X̂( f ) ∼ c f| f |2H+1 when | f | −→ ∞, (15)
where X̂ is the Fourier transform of X , c f is a constant having
dimension of variance, and H denotes the Hurst parameter.
It is noteworthy that c f and H can be interpreted as quan-
titative and qualitative measures of long-range dependence,
respectively. In the following, we discuss the long-range
dependence properties of the TCP and video broadcasting
traﬃc.
The transport layer mainly deals with end-to-end con-
gestion control and assures that arbitrarily large streams of
data are reliably delivered and arrive at their destination
in the order sent. With high-quality traﬃc measurements
at hand, accurate accounting of this multilevel hierarchy of
measured network traﬃc is possible because all the relevant
information can be obtained by looking inside the collected
packets. As a result of the hierarchy of protocol architectures,
between the transport and application layers, actual network
traﬃc can be viewed as the result of interwined mechanisms
and modes that exist at the diﬀerent network layers.
We consider a network with a number of users/sources
or end hosts communicating with each other in which
an individual source is modeled according to an on-oﬀ
alternating renewal process as follows. The source alternates
between an active state or on state where it sends packets into
the network and an inactive or oﬀ state where it is idle and




1, if time t is an on interval,
0, if time t is an oﬀ interval.
(16)
The length of the on intervals is identically distributed,
and so are the lengths of the oﬀ intervals. Furthermore,
the lengths of on and oﬀ intervals are independent. An oﬀ
interval always follows an on interval, and it is the pair of on
and oﬀ intervals that defines the interrenewal period.
Let Fon and Foﬀ denote the cumulative distribution
function of the on and oﬀ intervals, respectively. Let F = 1−F
denote a complementary cumulative distribution function.
Let also σon and σoﬀ represent the respective variances. For
x→∞,
either Fon(x) ∼ lonx−αon , 1 < αon < 2 or σon <∞,
either Foﬀ(x) ∼ loﬀx−αoﬀ , 1 < αoﬀ < 2 or σoﬀ <∞,
(17)
where αon, αoﬀ, lon, and loﬀ are constants.
When 1 < αon < 2, the distribution of on times is
said to be “heavily tailed” with exponent αon. Since it has
infinite variance, the on time can be very long with relatively
high probability. At this level,we interested in analyzing the
behavior of the cumulative load, L(t) = ∫ t0 P(u)du, at large
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where γ(u) = E(P(u)P(0)) − (E(P(0)))2 denotes the
covariance function of P. It has been shown in [13] that this
implies that
σL(t) ∼ σ2t2H as t −→ ∞,
where σ is a constant and H = (3−min(αon,αoﬀ))/2.
Similarly, video traﬃc can have self-similar behavior.
Motion Picture Expert Group (MPEG) is a set of stan-
dards for compression of video, or sequences of images.
There are several versions of the standards. MPEG-1 is
older, while MPEG-4 is more advanced and achieves bet-
ter compression performances than MPEG-1. The basic
principles of operation of both standards are rather sim-
ilar. Compression is achieved by reducing the spatial and
temporal redundancy in the sequence of images (frames).
Spatial redundancy (redundancy within an image) is reduced
by applying algorithms for compression of still images
(JPEG, e.g.).
It was proved in publications [19, 20] that variable bit
rate (vbr) video traﬃc can belong to the class of long-range
dependent processes as follows.
(i) The correlation of rk demonstrates the hyperbolic
decay for large delays k : rk→ c0k−β, as k→∞.
(ii) The power spectral density S(ω) for small frequency
values ω corresponds to the law S(ω)→ c1ωβ−1, as
ω→∞.
(iii) The variance σ2n of the sample mean value decreases
slower than the inverse sample size n : σ2n =
σ2(Xn)→ c2n−β, as n→∞ (Xn =
∑n
i=1Xi/n for several
constants c0, c1, c2).
The constant value β ∈ [0; 2] reflects the function type,
0 ≤ β < 1 indicates the long-range dependence, and 1 <
β ≤ 2 demonstrates the short-range data dependence. (The
persistence degree is often expressed with the help of the
Hurst exponent H = 1 − β/2.) The long-range dependence
is defined within the limits of the weak stationarity structure
[19, 21], that is, the stationarity in the wide sense.
The stationarity and the ergodicity allow statistical
estimates such as the mean value and the variance or other
model parameters to be found from each separate data
sample, or in this case from the separate time series. If
the assumptions of stationarity and ergodicity do not hold,
certain measures such as the mean value and the variance
may be without meaning. In reality, the mean value of the
VBR video time series converges very slowly, which can be
caused by nonstationarity and not necessarily by long-range
dependence. More details about this aspect are given in the
appendix.
7.2. TCP and Video Broadcasting Wavelet Analysis. Many
methods have been used to find a Hurst self-similarity
exponent estimate, such as R/S analysis, variance-time
plots, the periodogram analysis, and the Whittle analysis.
However, the long-range dependence property leads to a
serious estimate displacement and diﬃculties in making
a convergence estimate. Consequently, we investigate the
use of the wavelet transform in order to cope with the
aforementioned shortcuts.
The advantages of the wavelet analysis result from the
fact that the wavelet functions themselves demonstrate
the scaling property and, therefore, form the optimal
“coordinates system,” from which the scaling phenomena
can be traced. This analysis provides steady detection of
the scaling behavior, its type and an accurate measure-
ment of the parameters in order to describe this scaling
behavior.
According to Section 3, the time series X(t) is presented
in the form






k=0 sJ ,kϕJ ,k(t) is the initial approximation
function corresponding to the scale J (J ≤ Jmax); sJ ,k =
〈X(t),ϕJ ,k〉 is the scaling coeﬃcient equal to the scalar
product of the initial series X(t) and the scaling function of
the “roughest” scale J , displaced by k scale units to the right
from the origin of coordinates; Dj(t) =
∑n0/2J−1
k=0 dj,kψj,k(t) is
the refining function of the jth scale; and dJ ,k = 〈X(t),ψJ ,k〉
is the wavelet coeﬃcient for scale j equal to the scalar
product of the initial series X(t) and the wavelet with scale
j, displaced by k scale units to the right from the origin of
coordinates.
The normalized wavelet and scaling functions of the Haar














≤ t < 1,
0, otherwise,
(20)
where ψ is the orthonormal wavelet in L2(R) space. It is
called the Haar wavelet and {ψj,k : j, k ∈ Z} is the
orthonormal system in L2(R).
We find that the wavelet coeﬃcients for the time series
expansion over the wavelet functions basis and the Hurst




















= (2H − 1) j + CW ,
(21)
where Kj = n0/2 j is the wavelet coeﬃcient number for the
scale j; CW = c f C(α,ψ) is the parameter that does not
depend on scale j and α = 2H − 1.
The number of wavelet coeﬃcients decreases as the scale
increases. Formula (21) is used for the Hurst exponent
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estimate of the LRD video sequences. This means that if
X is the LRD process with the Hurst exponent H , the plot
of function j, referred to as the logarithmic diagram (LD),
should have the linear slope 2H − 1, and demonstrates that
the scaling exponent (2H − 1) can be obtained from the
plot slope estimate of the function log2((1/Kj)
∑Kj−1
k=0 |dj,k|2)
of j. Therefore, the Hurst exponent estimate can be found
by means of the choice of the approximated curve equation
using the weighted least squares (WLSs) method.
The logarithm of this variable will be the estimate of
log2μj , but will be displaced as the logarithm nonlinearity
shows that M log2(d
2
j ) /= log2(Md2j ) = jα+log2CW . As shown
in [22–24], we reduce the regression analysis problem to
consider the equation Myj = ja+log2CW . The estimation of
slope α can be obtained by carrying out the weighted linear
regression, in which xj = j and σ2j = Var(yj). Determining




j , and S2 =∑ j2
j= j1 j
























Assuming a weak correlation between wavelet coeﬃcients
in the case when dj,k are Gaussian values, the variance σ2j can


















is the generalized Rieman zeta function.
8. Experiments and Simulations
8.1. Traﬃc Fingerprinting. We tested the MODWT-based
radio fingerprinting method for three signals generated by
WLAN transceivers and three others generated by Bluetooth
transceivers. Through time shifts, we generated 300 signals
in order to test the time invariance property. Figures 2 and
3 illustrate the performance of our detection technique for
WLAN and Bluetooth signals, respectively. Figure 4 shows
that the MODWT detector (red line) performs better than
the DWT-based technique (green line). Besides, over the
300 signals, we found that the success detection rate for the
MODWT-based transient detection technique is about 89%























Figure 3: Transient detection from a signal generated by a
Bluetooth transceiver.
8.2. Simulation of the Anomaly Detection Module. In order
to assess the geometric clustering methodology proposed in
this paper, we simulated a network composed of 20 nodes.
The global flow consists of about 106 packets and the attack
rate is 0.1 (10% of the packets are spoofed). It is assumed
that the attack packets follow a Gaussian distribution within
the total traﬃc. The uncertainty related to MODWT-based
fingerprinting mechanism has been set to 10−3.
Based on these assumptions, we evaluated our anomaly-
based detection approach with respect to three well-known
methods: modified cluster TV [25], K nearest neighbors
(KNNs) [26], and support vector machine (SVM) [27]. This
evaluation is based on the receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) curves. The reader may wonder about the choice
of these methods since they are fundamentally supervised
while our geometric technique is unsupervised. In fact, we
try to demonstrate that even though geometric clustering
does not require a training set to optimize its intrinsic
parameters, its performance is comparable to supervised
clustering algorithms, which have been extensively used in
the intrusion detection context. From our experiments, we











Figure 4: Transient detection from a signal generated by a WLAN
transceiver and shifted by 10 samples.
found that not all the attacks could be detected. This may be
due to two essential factors.
(1) Using our feature map μw,s, some of the spoofed
frames can be in the same region of the feature space
as the normal frames. In fact, the signal fingerprinting
technique can provide falsely correlated fingerprints for
distinct physical addresses
(2) The parameters ε1 and ε2 do not fit the actual
probability distribution of the data traﬃc across the network.
For ε1 = ε2 = 0.8, we found that the geometric clustering
approach provides less false positives than the other methods
while keeping the same rate of false negatives (Figure 5).
Figure 6 plots the ROC curve for diﬀerent values of ε1 and ε2.
These results confirm our remark in Section 6.3 stating that,
on the opposite to the false negative rate, the false positive
rate decreases with respect to the values of ε1 and ε2.
One possible way to adapt 1 and 2 to the performance
of the classifier is to fix a priori a value for the area under the
ROC curve (AUC), and then estimate the values of 1 and
2 for which the ROC curve is characterized by the required
AUC. The AUC, which can be easily computed using the
formula
AUC = 1 + G
2
, (26)
where G is the Gini coeﬃcient [28], is the probability that
a classifier will rank a randomly chosen positive instance
higher than a randomly chosen negative one.
To reduce the computational cost of estimating 1 and
2, we can draw the ROC curves for two pairs (11, 12) and
(12, 12). Then, we compute the corresponding AUCs, say A1
and A2. Supposing that Ar is the required AUC, interpolating
functions (i.e., polynomials, splines) can be used to estimate
the values of r1 and r2. Obviously, more than two pairs can
be used for a more accurate estimation of r1 and r2. However,
this would result in a computational overhead.
8.3. Traﬃc Pattern Distortion Detection. To test the eﬃciency
of the traﬃc pattern distortion detector, we generated a TCP
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Figure 5: Performance of the geometric clustering algorithm with
respect to existing approaches.
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Figure 6: Performance of the geometric clustering algorithm
according to ε1 and ε2.
traﬃc respecting the statistical model presented in Section 7
and we injected eight denial-of-service attack instances.
We used the wavelet-based Hurst parameter estimator
described in Section 7 in conjunction with three change-
point detection algorithms which are moving window-
iterated cumulative sums of squares (MWICSSs), moving
window Schwarz information criterion (MWSIC), and mov-
ing window Wang’s jump (MWWJ) [29]. The simulation
scenario can be described through the following points.
Step 1. We apply the DWT and MODWT. The maximum
level of the transforms depends on the length of window.
Whitcher et al. [29] recommend to use at least 128 data
points to implement the variance change test. Moreover,





































4th, 6th, and 8th attacks
(b)
Figure 7: Detection of traﬃc distortion attacks within TCP traﬃc.
we want to apply to the coeﬃcients the Ljung-Box test for
autocorrelation with maximum lag 10 (see Step 2). For the
sake of clarity and computation cost eﬃciency, we choose to
compute wavelet transforms up to level 4.
Step 2. The application of the MWICSS and MWSIC
algorithms to test for variance changes requires uncorrelated
data. We, therefore, choose the DWT with highest P-value
among those packets of the tree for which the null hypothesis
of the Ljung-Box test for autocorrelation is not rejected.
Step 3. We test for variance changes (with either the ICSS or
the SIC algorithm) using the coeﬃcients of the DWT packet
selected from Step 2. If the null hypothesis that no variance
change occurs is rejected then we identify the location of the
change point using now the nondecimated wavelet packet
coeﬃcients of the packet selected in Step 2.
Step 4. Using the binary segmentation procedure, we repeat
Steps 1–3 with subsequent subseries until no further variance
change point is found. In the case of the ICSS procedure,
we also perform the additional confirmatory step on all
identified potential change points by using subseries of data
between adjacent points, as suggested by Incla´n and Tiao
[30].
Step 5. We record information of the type (t j ; f j), where t j is
a time location and f j is its frequency of detection, that is,
how many times a change at that point has been detected
by the method up to the window under consideration.
We declare a certain time point to be a variance change
if its frequency of detection is greater than or equal to
a predetermined threshold T . A smaller T implies not
only a faster detection but also a larger number of false
alarms.
Plots of Figure 7 give a graphical representation of the
performances of the three detection methods. There, each of
the two subplots contains a diﬀerent portion of the signal,
displaying 1st, 2nd, 3rd attacks and 4th, 6th, and 8th attacks,
respectively, as representatives of the two diﬀerent kinds of
change points, in mean and in variance. Results for MWICSS
and MWSIC are for a threshold level 2 and window size
128, those for MWWJ are for window size 128. In these
plots, the solid circles indicate the real change points, the
square rectangles, the points detected by the MWICSS, the
diamonds those detected by the MWSIC, and the triangles
those detected by the MWWJ. Notice how the MWICSS and
MWSIC algorithms do a better job at detecting attacks of
the first type, that show variance changes. However, there
appears to be an asymmetric aspect in the detection of these
two methods, in that both the MWICSS and the MWSIC
detect the start of the attacks but show a relative large delay in
detecting the ending points. In other words, these algorithms
seem to be sensitive to the location of the change points and
to the variance ratio.
9. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a multilayer intrusion detection
approach for wireless networks. Our approach combines
a physical layer antispoofing filter with advanced statisti-
cal traﬃc anomaly detectors. The antispoofing technique
consists of a radio signal fingerprinting mechanism and
a geometrical clustering algorithm while traﬃc anomaly
detection is based on the estimation of the Hurst parameter
of the real traﬃc. Thorough simulations show that our
IDS provides better performance than the most known
existing approaches. Furthermore, a postprocessing module
is currently under development. Cooperative tracking using
large groups of mobile detector nodes is investigated to this
purpose. A Kalman filter-like estimator is being implemented
and tested in order to examine the eﬀect of the detector
node density in the monitored area on the accuracy of the
tracking results. More precisely, we assess the improvement
in tracking eﬃciency per additional detector node as the
coverage of the monitored region increases.
Appendix
Stationarity Testing for Stochastic Processes
Let X(n), n = 0, 1, 2, . . . , be the stochastic process with the
power spectral density S(ω). This process periodogram can













where X is the sample mean value which converges to
(1/2)S(ω)χ22 (see, e.g., [31]) for ω /= 0;±π;±2π; . . .. This
implies that ÎN (ω) for large N is an unbiased but ungrounded
estimate, as limN→∞σ2ÎN (ω) = S2(ω). Nevertheless, it is true
that for two fixed frequencies, ω1 and ω2, the periodogram
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ordinates ÎN (ω1) and ÎN (ω2) are approximately noncor-
related. These properties are also correct for long-range
dependent processes [21]. The application of the spectral




ÎN (ω)Λ(Θ− ω)dω. (A.2)
Choosing the Bartlett-Priestley spectral window
[31] gives the following expression σ2[IN (ω)] ≈
[(6M)/(5M)]S2(ω) for the variance. The variance still
depends on the power spectral density itself. To avoid this
functional dependence, the logarithmic variance stabilizing
transform can be used [32].



















where ω /= 0;±π; . . .. Thus, the estimate log(IN ) is closer
to the normal value than the nontransformed estimate. To
prove (or to negate) the assumption of weak nonstationarity,
the X process is divided into I segments, each of which
is centered by time ti and has the length N . For each ith
segment, the power spectral density IN ,i(ω) is calculated in
accordance with (A.2). The discretization of the smoothed
periodogram (A.2) is carried out by frequencies ωi =
π j/N ( j = j0 + kΔ j, k = 0, 1, . . . , J), and taking a
logarithm gives the two-dimensional random variable Yij =
log[IN ,i(ωj)]. If the frequencies ωi, like the times ti, have
a wide enough dispersion, the random variable Yij is
distributed approximately normally and is noncorrelated
[33]. The assumption of Yij approximate normality and lack
of correlation in both measurements imply Yij approximate
independence. Therefore, to define the structure of the basic
random process the method of variance analysis can be used
[32, 33]












+ ηi j , (A.5)
where ηi j is the independent and identically distributed
normal random variable with zero mean value and variance
σ2, defined by the relation (A.4). The presence of c(ti,ωi) and


















where the dot shows the mean value over the index for which
it substitutes: for example, Y.j =
∑I
i=1 Yij/I . In the stationary
process, the terms c(ti,ωi) and a(ti) can be expected to
disappear. In this case, the variables SI+R/σ2 and ST/σ2 are
χ2-distributed with (I − 1)(J − 1) and (I − 1) degrees of
freedom, respectively. The stationarity hypothesis is rejected
if one of the statistical tests exceeds 1% of the quantile of
the appropriate χ2 distribution. This test cannot be used in
the case of long-range dependence because the noise is not
normally distributed and correlated.
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